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Abstract. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of an infor-
mation campaign to counter a social engineering attack via the telephone. Four dif-
ferent offenders phoned 48 employees and made them believe that their PC was
distributing spam emails. Targets were told that this situation could be solved by
downloading and executing software from a website (i.e. an untrusted one). A total
of 46.15 % of employees not exposed to the intervention followed the instructions
of the offender. This was significantly different to those exposed to an intervention
1 week prior to the attack (9.1 %); however there was no effect for those exposed
to an intervention 2 weeks prior to the attack (54.6 %). This research suggests that
scam awareness-raising campaigns reduce vulnerability only in the short term.
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1. Introduction
Since 2008 a scam has been carried out by employees claiming to belong to Microsoft’s
technical department [1]. A phone call is received unexpectedly at home; the caller intro-
duces himself and proceeds to inform the home owner that there is a virus on the PC or
that the PC is distributing spam emails. To verify the claim from the caller, the victim is
persuaded to open a remote desktop session to review some warnings in the system log
files. In order to resolve the problem, the caller advises the victim to buy a small software
tool to prevent loosing valuable data. The solution can be bought on their website and
payment is possible via either credit card or PayPal. When the victim next checks the
bank account, he/she discovers that the savings have disappeared. The victim thinks that
he/she is securing the system whilst in fact the opposite has taken place.
Since 2011, the Dutch Fraud Help Desk (an organisation that collects fraud data) has
received 4000 reports of this Microsoft technical support scam in The Netherlands. In
2014, there were 856 people who filed a complaint, and 88 (10.28 %) of them admitted
to have paid the scammers. From January until September 2015 there were already 1099
complaints filed, of which 154 (14 %) involved payment. This constitutes a significant
increase in both i) the number of filed complaints (z = 31.396, p = .000) and ii) the
number of victims (z = 30.130, p = .000) for a short period of time. These numbers
indicate that people are vulnerable to social engineering via the telephone.
Information security has been treated as a technical problem for many years, result-
ing mainly in technical solutions [2] and overlooking the human aspect [3]. Since in-
formation technology becomes more integrated into our daily activities, security experts
propose that social engineering will be the greatest threat to any security system [2]. One
example of social engineering is the technical support scam [4].
This paper therefore explores: i) the extent to which people are susceptible to
telephone-based social engineering attacks when they are persuaded to go to a website
and download a software and, ii) the effectiveness of an intervention to reduce the effects
of social engineering over time.
1.1. Informing people to change behaviour
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of Persuasion describes how information is
processed and can be tailored to the receivers [5]. According to the ELM, people pro-
cess information via either the peripheral or the central route. The peripheral route of
information processing is used when there is minimal attention to the message and can
involve superficial cues, such as the attractiveness of the message presented. One may
like the sound of a person’s voice, or that person might have gone to the same univer-
sity as one did. The central route, on the other hand, involves persuasion on the basis of
the message’s content, such as voting for the political party with the best arguments [6].
Consistent with the ELM theory, attitudes obtained via the central route last longer, are
less vulnerable to contra-argumentation and are better predictors of human behaviour.
Furthermore, the effect of persuasive communication increases if the message is relevant
to the audience and if surprises and repetitions are used [5].
Studies about leaflets have successfully increased the knowledge of the general pub-
lic [7], as well as more specific groups such as patients [8], parents [9], and customers
[10]. Experts argue that both training and education can help protect users against phish-
ing [11]. It is noted that the currently available intervention materials can be effective as
long as the user actually reads the material [11].
Gadgets can be used as subtle reminders of a campaign and are mentioned in the
theory of Situational Crime Prevention as elements that ‘remove excuses’ [12]. Although
the literature on reminder cues is limited, research suggests that these are effective [13].
In previous work we showed that exposing university personnel to both an information
leaflet and a subtle reminder contributes to a significant reduction in the success rate of
a social engineering attack [14].
1.2. Retention
In 1885 Herman Ebbinghaus demonstrated the existence of memory decay over time
[15]. In addition, he described the ‘forgetting curves’, which refer to the amount of new
information one is able to learn with each repetition of the same content. The amount of
new information learned after each repetition decreases less steeply, meaning that more
and more information stays in one’s memory [15]. Retention can relate to knowledge but
it can also relate to skill and is not limited to a single context as shown in the examples
below.
sisted of PhD-candidates, Post-Doc researchers as well as Assistant and Associate pro-
fessors. The sample consisted of 34.29 % of all possible targets; the nationality distribu-
tion was comparable to the overall nationality distribution of the faculty, while those in
the experimental sample were slightly younger (38 vs. 41 years).
2.2. Researchers
The researchers (i.e. the “offenders”) consisted of 4 bachelor students (2 female and 2
male). The age of the researchers ranged between 21 and 24, the average age was 22.25
years (SD = 1.26). All researchers were Dutch nationals. There was no restriction with
regards to approaching subjects of the same gender.
Procedure One-third of the potential subjects was exposed to an information campaign
two weeks before the experiment whilst another one-third was exposed one week before.
The research departments were randomly selected and all their staff was exposed to the
intervention.
The intervention consisted of two parts: i) a leaflet informing staff about what con-
stitutes a scam and describing how scammers operate, how to detect them and what to do
and ii) a reminder in the form of a semi-transparent card holder with the university logo
on one side and the text “Beware of scams. Verify all requests. Report all incidents.” on
the other side.
The leaflets were designed using story telling to ensure that non experts could under-
stand it as well [20]. The leaflet represents the information medium and the card holder
represents a cue to remember the message. Departmental secretaries were responsible
for distributing the materials and they were unaware that this was part of an experiment.
The leaflet was distributed via email, whereas the card holder was distributed in person.
All subjects were approached via telephone between 0930h and 1700h, on an normal
Monday during term time.
The researchers were randomly assigned to a target, however if the researcher recog-
nised a target, this target person was randomly assigned to another researcher. Each re-
searcher approached the subject using the following script:
Hi this is [name]. We discovered that the PC you are using is distributing spam emails.
This is caused by a malicious program that is running in the background. Did you
notice that your PC was a bit slower lately? There is nothing to be ashamed of,
there are other people who have the same problem. I already helped 3 people to fix
this earlier this morning. Luckily this is easy and quick to solve. Do you have 2
or 3 minutes time, so that we can remove it together right away? Please click the
link that appears in the chat window. URL: http://removespam.utwente.info.
To proceed to the download, please enter the validation code; this is your complete
employee number. The complete number can be found on the back of your employee
card. Please save the file to your Desktop and execute it. After the program is finished,
could you read out the completion code?
All targets were subjected to the same script and request. After the target indicated
that the downloaded file was installed, the debriefing procedure was started. During the
debriefing procedure the target was told that this was an experiment, and asked some
demographic information, employment length, some computer characteristics and their
reasons for or against downloading and installing the software. Finally, the importance
of not sharing any information about the experiment with colleagues was explained; all
subjects acknowledged this and agreed not to disclose any information. This was checked
during the debriefing and none of the subjects stated having had prior knowledge of the
experiment.
2.3. Variables and Analysis
The variables used in the analysis were: compliance, intervention, age, offender and sex.
The dependent variable compliance measured whether the subject complied with the re-
quest of the offender to download and install the software package. The dichotomous
variable was dummy coded as 0 = did not comply, 1 = did comply. The independent vari-
able intervention measured whether the subject was exposed to the intervention (0 = not
exposed to the intervention, 1 = exposed to the intervention 1 week before, 2 = exposed
to the intervention 2 weeks before). The independent continuous variable age measured
the age in whole years at the moment of the attack. The independent categorical vari-
able offender measured who performed the attack (1 = researcher1, . . . , 4 = researcher4).
The independent dichotomous variable sex was measured for both the subjects and the
researchers and was dummy coded (0 = female, 1 = male). The hypothesis was tested
using cross-tabulation and c2.
3. Results
A total of 48 subjects were approached. No ‘target sex’ effect on compliance (c2 = .470,
d f = 1, p = .493), ‘offender sex’ effect on compliance (c2 = .176, d f = 1, p = .675),
‘offender’ effect on compliance (c2 = 4.253, d f = 3, p = .354) and ‘target age’ effect on
compliance (OR = .997, p = .905) were found and therefore these issues are not further
mentioned.
The debriefing procedure was used to verify that the subjects were coded correctly
(i.e. had received an intervention or had not received an intervention). The subjects who
recalled receiving the intervention material were coded as intervention group whilst those
who could not recall having received any intervention material were coded as control
group.
3.1. H1: “Time influences the relation between compliance and intervention.”
The compliance for the control group was 46.15 % compared to 9.09 % for those ex-
posed to the information campaign 1 week prior to the measurement. The compliance
of those exposed to the campaign 1 week prior was 9.09 % compared to 54.55 % for
those exposed to the campaign 2 weeks prior to the measurement. The compliance for
the control group was 46.15 % compared to 54.55 % for those exposed to the campaign
2 weeks prior to the measurement. A difference was found between the control and the 1
week group, furthermore a difference was found between the 1 week and 2 week group.
However no difference was found between the control and the 2 week group. Hypothesis
1 is therefore accepted. Refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics.
Table 1. Number of observations and percentages per intervention condition over time
Intervention
No 1 week 2 weeks Total
Complied No 14 (53.85%) 10 (90.91%) 5 (45.45%) 29 (60.42%)
Yes 12 (46.15%) 1 (9.09%) 6 (54.55%) 19 (39.58%)
Total 26 (100%) 11 (100%) 11 (100%) 48 (100%)
Group control = 1 week (c2 = 4.659, d f = 1, p = .031);
Group control = 2 week (c2 = 0.218, d f = 1, p = .641;
Group 1 week = 2 week (c2 = 5.238, d f = 1, p = .022);
4. Discussion
This study investigated whether an information campaign influences the compliance with
a telephone request to download and install software available on the internet, over time.
An information campaign consisting of i) informing employees about the dangers
of telephone scams and ii) distributing a card holder with a reminder text was effective
in the short term to reduce the vulnerabilty of employees to follow a stranger’s request
to perform actions on their PC.
In total 9.09 % of the employees exposed to an information campaign (1 week prior
to the attack) compared to 46.15 % in the control group complied with the request to
download and execute software available on the internet. Those not exposed to the cam-
paign (1 week prior) have 8.13 higher odds of complying with the offenders request.
These findings are in line with the results Bulle´e et al. [14] in which university personnel
was approached by strangers and asked to hand over their keys.
The employees exposed 2 weeks prior showed no difference to the control group.
The CPR studies of Madden [19] and Broomfield [17] both showed a significant decay
since the training, however they measured their decay over a period of 10 weeks time.
One explanation for the difference could be the modality of information that is trans-
ferred, (i.e. visual leaflet). The effect of different modalities on memory has been shown
in an experiment where the subjects had to remember and recall a list of words or au-
ditory representations. The results showed that the auditory representations had both a
significant better i) recall and ii) recall order of the presented stimuli [21]. Glenberg
showed that this auditory modality effect is also present in long term memory, this means
that auditory stimuli were better remembered in the long term compared to their visual
counterparts [22].
An second alternative explanation could be in the process of creating a memory.
There are 3 processes that constitute memory processing: i) Encoding, ii) Consolidation
and iii) Retrieval. Encoding is the process of forming mental representations of the ma-
terials one wants to put in memory. The process of encoding is enhanced by elaboration
(interpretation of the materials and connecting them to other materials) and trying to re-
peat it to oneself [23]. Attention is important as well; when attention is divided as en-
coding will be weaker and later attempts to remember are likely to fail [24, p. 202]. The
consolidation process modifies the mental representation in such a way that it becomes
stable in memory. Consolidation of the declarative memory (explicit memory contain-
ing experiences and information) can be affected by sleep [25], caffeine intake [26] and
age [27]. Finally, retrieval is important to access the knowledge in the brain via cues.
The context (e.g. physical surrounding) in which a memory is created is important for
retrieval. The theory of optimistic bias states that people believe that positive events are
more likely to occur to them than to other people [28] and that negative events are more
likely to occur to other people than to themselves. In the context of the information cam-
paign, a possibility is that the subjects could not identify themselves with the material
because they thought that it was not applicable to them, since there are others who were
more vulnerable. In both cases the subjects will not have the appropriate attention to
properly encode the material to make it last in the memory.
A third explanation could be that the information campaign is too abstract and there-
fore an ambiguous memory cue is created for the material. Once the subject is ‘attacked’
there is no proper recollection of the cue to memory and he/she fails to recollect the
materials in the information campaign. This could explain the difference between the 1
and 2 week groups as the cues are simply forgotten over time. It would be too simple to
say that the subjects forgot about the information campaign since there were questions
to control for this, since the subjects stated they recalled having received and read the
materials.
Limitations This study has 2 limitations: i) The current study has a limited number of
observations, therefore only a limited number of variables could be tested. ii) All subjects
were from the same organisation, replication in other organisations would be needed.
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